Our aim in this paper is to look at graph-theoretic and coalition-formation approaches to the development of exchange networks among spatially separated traders. In particular, we shall show:
Introduction
Stateless tribal societies in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere in Melanesia are characterized by a system of recurrent gift exchanges between pairs of partners connected in complex networks. Of these many gift-exchange systems, the most famous in anthropological litera-ture is the Kula Ring, which is described in great detail by Malinowski (1922) . Subsequent work by anthropologists such as Mauss (1954) , Uberoi (1971) Belshaw (1965) , Sahlins (1965) , and Dalton (1978) , among others, have attempted to explain the Kula gift-exchange system in terms of its role in creating friendly political alliances among potentially hostile neighboring tribes so as to facilitate intertribal commercial trade. The view that Kula gift exchange creates political order which facilitated intertribal trade while explaining one major puzzle of the Kula King leaves unanswered two other Kula puzzles not explained by anthropologists nor by anyone else:
(1) Why is the Kula trade organized in the form of a ring of trading partners; and (2) Why in the Kula King are there two different kinds of Kula cermonial objects perpetually circulating in opposite directions among the ring of partners? Landa (1980) has provided an economic explanation of these two enigmatic aspects of the Kula King, drawing on property rights-public choice theory and the economics of signalling.
In the absence of a central marketplace, the ring structure of Kula trade is an institutional arrangement which economizes on trading costs (transportation and transaction costs) of organizing trade in N-spatially separated markets: each Kula trader needs to visit only two adjacent markets in order to acquire all traded goods when N-markets are connected together in a ring. This two-adjacent-market system can be viable only if all Kula partners abide by the rules of the Kula game (i.e., giving, receiving, and passing on the Kula gifts). The two different Kula gift objects, circulating in opposite directions among the connected chain of Kula partners, is an efficient signalling and monitoring device for the enforcement of the rules of the Kula game.
In explaining the two Kula puzzles, Landa also has provided a theory of the origins of the Kula King: The Kula Ring emerged by an "invisible hand process": the structural effects of each Kula trader, establishing two pair-wise Kula partnerships with neighboring traders, located on a ring of islands, generate a ring structure of Kula partnerships. The invisible hand process is, in effect, an entrepreneuriul process in which each Kula trader perceives opportunities for making a profit by engaging in arbitrage between adjacent markets and seizes the opportunities by linking up a set of all submarkets. ' In this way, the entrepreneurial process will ensure that all N-spatially separated markets, located in a circular pattern, will eventually be linked up to form a ring of markets. ' Our aim in this paper, which is an extension of Landa's work on the Kula Ring, is to look at graph-theoretic and coalition-formation approaches to the development of exchange networks among spatially separated Kula traders. In particular, we shall show (1) that a decentralized trading structure involving bilateral trading with left-hand and right-hand neighbors in a connected ring can, for certain specified spatial arrangement of traders, be more efficient in minimizing total transportation costs of goods than a centralized marketplace trading structure;
and (2) that an adaptation of a model of sequential protocoalition formation proposed by Grofman (1982) can be used to predict the exact sequence of the development of the Kula Ring decentralized trading network. We shall also briefly discuss how graph theory can be used as a tool to explicate the underlying market structure of a given network of Kula traders. We begin this paper with a review of some of the essential facts about the Kula Ring and the environmental setting within which it operates.
The Kula Ring and its environmental setting
The It is the opportunities for profit-making uia intermarket arbitrage that provided the entrepreneurial process of connecting hitherto unconnected markets uia the political process of establishing Kula partnerships. As profit-making Kula traders, the incentive exists for each trader to economize on total trading costs which consist of transportation and transaction costs. In a world of N-spatially separated markets, transportation costs comprise a significant portion of total trading costs. We shall show that a ring structure of trading networks, under certain specified conditions, is Pareto-superior to a central marketplace trading structure for economizing on transportation costs.
Centralized versus decentralized trade structures
Consider a set of geographically dispersed traders arranged in a circular structure as if around some perimeter (see Figure 1) . It might appear obvious that efficient trade relationships call for the creation of a central market at point 0, the circle's origin, thus creating a (Kula) star structure. Actually, the situation is more complex. Let us initially posit zero transaction costs involved in the handling of trade goods by intermediaries.
Rather, the total costs of trade shall be assumed to be a linear function of the distance over which goods must travel from point of origin to point of destination.
If we have a central market 0, the distance, DC, over which any goods will travel from point of origin to point of destination which trader V, trades only with his right-hand neighbor v+ 1, and with his left-hand neighbor y-i. To get a good from lJk to V,,, we traverse the chords of the arcs from I', to Vk+i, Vk+i to Vk+2, and Vk+,_i to V k+,. This distance may be reasonably well approximated as the arc of  { V,, V,, But since the sum of the chord lengths is always less than the arc length, our result is only strengthened.
A more serious problem is that, in looking at the average trade, we have failed to look at incentives for any given trade. It may be that for any given trader, costs of transport rise more than linearly with distance -because of uncertainties in navigation, inadequate food storage for long trips, etc. In such a case, it may be that any given trader will prefer pairwise trade with his neighbor to a trip to the central market at 0 only if the distance to his neighbor is less than R. We show in Figure 2 that this condition is satisfied, for a symmetric distribution of traders, if N 2 6, since a 60" angle gives us an equilateral triangle with chord length (distance between traders) equal to R. If we use arc lengths instead of chords, it is easy to see that Result I. For N 2 6, for a uniform distribution of traders in a circular pattern, a pairwise trading pattern (ring) is more efficient in minimizing total transport costs than is a centralized market. It is straightforward to generalize this result to the case of an elliptical dispersion of traders. The circumference of an ellipse is V( a + b), where a and b are the radii of the ellipse's major and minor axes. If we let a -C b, then the minimal distance from any point to the ellipse's center of gravity is simply a. Hence, Result 2. For a symmetric distribution of traders around the perimeter of an ellipse, for all traders to prefer to trade with their neighbor rather than at a central market located at the center of gravity of the ellipse, it is sufficient to have A second approach is to look at the set of K "nearest-neighbors" and to posit that each trader engages in trade with these nearest neighbors (for example, Irwin (1981) looks at a three-nearest-neighbor model of Kula trade). While this is not an unreasonable way to proceed, it fails to take into account that trade is a process of exchange: that i wishes to trade with j does not guarantee that j wishes to trade with i, when there may be other alternative traders available with whom; might deal. We propose a third approach, one which posits the development of trade routes through a process of individual independent choices rather than positing a global search for overall efficiency, and one which looks at trade as a process of reciprocal choice of exchange partners. Because of the possibilities of middleman trade we may assume that all actors have goods which are desired in trade by all actors (see Table 2 ). Having shown that the decentralized ring-structure is, under certain specified conditions, Pareto-superior to a central marketplace structure, we shall now attempt to provide a model of how the exact sequence of segments of the Kula Ring conceptually might have emerged; our model is based on two-nearest-neighbor "short-path-matrix" analysis. We have shown in Table 1 a distance chart for the 11 trading partners in the central Melanesian Kula ring including the Trobriand islands (see Map 2). On the basis of the data in Table 1 , we can readily construct N2 for this trading network (see Figure 3) . Figure 3 is not symmetric, though it is nearly so. N2 n Ni indicates which choices of trade partners are reciprocated. We show N, n N$' in 
(1)
(1) 
Model I
We may generate a trade structure based on the two nearest neighbors by an iterative process which takes into account reciprocal choice. In this first simple model, which we shall label Model I, we shall consider any trader with two trade partners as saturated. This leaves Gawa, Iwa, Kaurai, Tubetube, and Vakuta as still in need of additional trading partners. Now let us look at the matrix of two nearest neighbors, confining ourselves to the reduced set of nonsaturated trading actors. (For Gawa and Kaurai we shall actually look only at the one nearest neighbor since each already has one trading partner.)
Now we can repeat our earlier tactic and look at the intersection of the matrix in Figure 5 with its own transpose.
This gives us Figure 6 . Now Gawa and Iwa are saturated, leaving Tubetube in need of two trading partners and Kaurai and Vakuta each in need of one.
Repeating the process, we obtain Figure 7 . We shall not bother to show the intersection of this matrix and its transpose. It is apparent that Iwa is now saturated and Kaurai and Vakuta will trade (and bc fully saturated) but that Tubetube has no trading partners. At this point the process is complete, but the resultant structure is not a ring; rather it is several rings and one singleton. 5 Kiriwina, Kitava, and Sinaketa form a self-enclosed triplet as do N.W. Dobu, S.E. Dobu, and Dobu Island. Also, Vakuta, Iwa, Gawa, and Kaurai form a ring. Tubetube is, however, an isolate structure. The structure generated by this sequence can be depicted as below.
2-3-4
7~5-6~1 9++10++11 8.
We could proceed to consider the structure that would be generated if we assumed that three trading links were needed to produce saturation, or the structure that would be generated by practical choices in a three-nearest-neighbor model [as has been done by Irwin (1981) ], but we shall instead consider a closely related alternative approach which is a variant of a sequential model of proto-coalition formation proposed in Grofman (1982) .
A dynamic model of proto-coalition formation applied to the development of trading linkages in the Kula Islands' Inner Kula Ring

Model II
The basic idea of the second model we shall propose is quite simple, and similar to the two-nearest-neighbor model we offered in the previous section of the paper. We begin with a nearest neighbor matrix, N,. If i is the nearest neighbor of i and j is also the nearest neighbor of i, then we posit that i and j become permanent trading partners. In other Figure 8 .
This matrix is equivalent to the following disconnected graph 1~2++3+-+4~5++6~7 11 t, 10 t* 9 ++ 8.
It is clear that we would obtain a ring structure The next stage, stage 7, of our proto-coalition the (1,ll) link-up, i.e., the string shown below.
if l-11 and7+-+8. process gives rise to However, we still have only a string, not a ring. To generate the ring structure, Tubetube must go to sea (to Kaurai) or vice oersa! There are Stages of a dynamic model of proto-coalition (Grofman 1982) as the inner Kula Ring (distances only approximate).
- 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided two theorems on decentralized trading structures.
We have shown that, under certain conditions, the Kula Ring structure (the two-adjacent-market system) is Pareto-superior to the "Kula Star" structure (a central marketplace) in economizing on transportation costs. Having demonstrated that the Kula King structure is efficient in terms of reducing transportation costs, we then attempt to predict the exact sequence of the emergence of segments of the Kula Ring trading network, first by using the two-neighbors graph-theoretic
In fact, Tubetube is a community of seafarers who regularly travel further distances by sea than traders from other islands (see Irwin. 1981 
